In his first official bilateral visit to Kazakhstan since April 2008, President Islam Karimov and other senior Uzbekistani officials discussed a range of important bilateral, regional and international issues with their Kazakhstani counterparts in Astana on September 6–7, 2012. These topics included boosting two-way economic ties, discouraging other Central Asian countries from taking actions that threatened their water supplies, and discussing how to manage the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan. READ MORE

The Lower Chamber of Uzbekistan’s Parliament – the Oliy Majlis – approved the country’s own national security strategy, “The Concept Paper on the Foreign Policy Activity of Uzbekistan.” One of the essential elements in this articulated strategy is the position not to take part in any politico-military blocs (News.olam.uz, Mir24.tv, August 1). In light of Tashkent’s earlier decision to suspend its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (see EDM, July 11, 18), Uzbekistan is sending a clear signal to the parties concerned that it is not going to restrict itself to an alignment with any single great power. It may also underline Tashkent’s long-term desire to eventually assume a regional leadership role in Central Asia. READ MORE

The longest section of the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China transit pipeline passes through Kazakhstan’s territory: it measures 1,115 kilometers in length, of the total 1,830-kilometer Turkmenistan-China distance. Kazakhstan is adding a dedicated export pipeline for its own gas exports to China. In combination, these developments (alongside planned oil exports) confer to Kazakhstan a major role in China’s energy security calculations. READ MORE

Uzbekistan is often cast as a reluctant or difficult member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), because of its consistent opposition to new initiatives in either body and relentless prudence concerning its participation in multilateral military exercises. Yet, the complex policymaking in Tashkent that produces such thorny approaches to security issues is also frequently refracted through the Russian media in such a way as to distort its purposes or deeper considerations. Once again, behind the colorful official claims of success surrounding the latest SCO Peace Mission exercise, Tashkent exposed the disunity in the organization by refusing to participate (Interfax, June 9). READ MORE